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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: DOUBLE JEOPARDY-NEW APPROACH TO 
THE "MANIFEST NECESSITY RULE" 
l. INTRODUCTION 
This note will examine the double jeopardy provision of the fifth 
amendment and the application of that provision by the federal courts 
through the "manifest necessity rule." It will discuss the "liberalizing" 
trend the federal courts have been taking in this area and the present 
status of the double jeopardy provision. 
II. THE CASE 
On January 25, 1971, the United States Supreme Court handed 
down the decision in United States v. Jorn. 1 Milton C. Jorn, the defen-
dant, was charged with willfully assisting in the preparation of fraudu-
lent income tax returns.2 The federal district court3 had impaneled a 
jury, and an agent for the Internal Revenue Service had testified. The 
Government's next five witnesses were taxpayers, who allegedly had 
been aided by Jorn in preparing their returns. The trial judge refused 
to allow the taxpayers' testimony, stating as his reason his doubt that 
the taxpayers had been given adequate warning of their constitutional 
rights when initial contact had been made by the Internal Revenue 
Service. The trial judge then declared a mistrial in order to give the 
witnesses an opportunity to consult with attorneys: The mistrial ruling 
was made without the consent of the defendant, and notwithstanding the 
fact that the first taxpayer to be called as a witness and the prosecuting 
attorney both stated that the taxpayers had been warned of their consti-
tutional rights when first contacted. 
The case was set for retrial. However, before the second jury was 
impaneled, Jorn moved for dismissal on the grounds of former jeopardy. 
The motion was granted and the Government took direct appeal to the 
United States .Supreme Court.4 Six members of the Court agreed with 
the district court's ruling and affirmed. 
III. BACKGROUND 
Former jeopardy is provided for in the fifth amendment of the 
United States Constitution,5 and the United States Supreme Court in 
I. 400 u.s. 470 (1971). 
2. See 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2) (1954). 
3. District of Utah. 
4. Appeal was under 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1949). 
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be 
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Green v. United States announced the policy behind this constitutional 
safeguard: 
[T]he State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to 
make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, 
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and com-
pelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well 
as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found 
guilty.6 
As important as this policy is, the fifth amendment is not an abso-
lute bar to reprosecution, but must be balanced with society's interest 
"in fair trials designed to end in just judgments."7 With a view toward 
balancing these interests, the United State Supreme Court stated in 
United States v. Perez: 
[T]he law has invested Courts of justice with the authority to discharge 
a jury from giving any verdict, whenever . . . taking all circumstances 
into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends 
of public justice would otherwise be defeated .... To be sure, the 
power ought to be used with the greatest caution, under urgent circum-
stances, and for very plain and obvious causes .... 8 (emphasis added) 
The "manifest necessity rule" has never been clearly defined, but, 
as the Court pointed out, the determination must be made upon the 
circumstances of each individual case. The federal courts have held in 
the past that a manifest necessity did exist when there was a hungjury,0 
the jurors might be biased, 10 the trial judge during the proceedings 
discovered the indictment was defective, 11 a juror12 or the defendant13 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... " But see Note, Double Jeopardy: The Reprosecution 
Problem, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1272 (1964) which contends that the amendment's ambigious terms, 
coupled with its common law background, originally prohibited reprosecution only after a verdict 
of acquittal or conviction. The article continues to point out that the English law today retains the 
rule that jeopardy does not attach before verdict. 
6. 355 u.s. 184, 187-88 (1947). 
7. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949); accord, United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 
479-80 {1971). The Court said: 
"[A] criminal trial is a ... complicated affair to manage .•.. [I]t becomes readily 
apparent that a mechanical rule prohibiting retrial whenever circumstances compel the 
discharge of a jury without the defendant's consent would be too high a price to pay for 
the added assurance of personal security and freedom from governmental harassment 
.... '[A] defendant's valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal 
must in some circumstances be subordinated to the public's interest in fair trials designed 
to end in just judgments'." 
8. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824). 
9. /d. 
10. Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891). 
II. Simpson v. United States, 229 F. 940 (9th Cir. 1916), cert. denied, 241 U.S. 668 (1916), 
12. United States v. Potash, 118 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 584 (1941). 
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became too ill to continue, the district attorney unfairly prejudiced the 
jury, 14 wrongful remarks on the part of the trial judge were made, 15 or 
the tactical needs of the military deserved consideration, 16 just to men-
tion a few. 
With the "manifest necessity rule" the courts had very little diffi-
culty in affording valid reasons for allowing reprosecution where a 
mistrial had been declared for reasons other than misconduct on the 
part of the government or the trial judge. The 1961 case of Gori v. 
United States, 11 made the fifth amendment right even more "illusory." 
In that case the trial judge had declared a mistrial due to a line of 
questioning which he considered designed to disclose the defendant's 
prior crimes. The Court allowed reprosecution, basing its decision on 
several grounds. It reasoned that the trial judge had exercised his discre-
tion which an appellate court would not reverse except on a clear show-
ing of abuse, that the trial judge had acted in the best interest of the 
accused which was not an abuse of his discretion, and that the trial judge 
was in a much better position to determine the necessity of a mistrial 
than an appellate court. 
Even though the Gori decision widened the area in which reprose-
cution was permitted, it also marked the turning point to a more "liberal 
view" of double jeopardy.18 This view is indicated by the slim majority 
and the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by the Chief 
Justice, Justices Black and Brennan, in which Justice Douglas stated, 
"[t]he policy of the Bill of Rights is to make rare indeed the occasions 
when the citizen can for the same offense be required to run the gantlet 
twice." 19 
The liberalizing trend continued,20 and in 1969 the Court handed 
down its decision in Benton v. Maryland. 21 Until that time the Court 
had held that the double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment was 
not applicable to the states,22 but in Benton the Court stated: 
13. United States v. Stein, 140 F. Supp. 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). 
14. Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 
(1949). 
15. United States v. Giles, 19 F. Supp. 1009 (W.D. Okla. 1937). 
16. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949). 
17. 367 u.s. 364 (1961). 
18. See Note, Double Jeopardy: The Reprosecution Problem, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1272, 1277 
(1964). 
19. 367 u.s. 364, 373 (1961). 
20. See, e.g., Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963) where the Court, Mr. Justice 
Douglas writing the majority opinion, refused to allow reprosecution when the jury had been 
discharged over the defendant's objection for failure of a key witness to appear. 
21. 395 u.s. 784 (1969). 
22. See Palko v. Conn., 302 U.S. 319 (1937). 
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[W]e today find that the double jeopardy prohibition of the Fifth 
Amendment represents a fundamental ideal in our constitutional heri-
tage, and that it should apply to the States through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 23 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION 
In Jorn the Court has continued to widen the double jeopardy 
protection. The case has been characterized as, "the penultimate if not 
the end product of a 'trend toward reducing the occasions on which 
criminal defendants may be made to "run the gantlet twice".' " 24 
In Jorn the Court reviewed the use of discretion by the trial judge 
and concluded that there had been an abuse fn that no effort was made 
to avoid a mistrial. The Court pointed out that there was reason to 
believe that adequate warning of constitutional rights had been given to 
the witnesses, and if not, a continuance would have been more in order 
than a mistrial. In other words, there was no demonstration of a mani-
fest necessity for a mistrial. 
The government was relying on Gori, but the Court pointed out 
that in Gori, reprosecution was allowed because the trial judge was 
acting on behalf of the defendant in declaring a mistrial, whereas, in the 
present case, the trial judge was acting on behalf of the witnesses, rather 
than the defendant. The Court pointed out that they would not consider 
a hypothetical situation concerning who would finally receive the benefit 
of the mistrial. The Court then said: 
Further, we think that a limitation on the abuse-of-discretion principle 
based on an appellate court's assessment of which side benefited from 
the mistrial ruling does not adequately satisfy the policies underpinning 
the double jeopardy provision. Reprosecution after a mistrial has unnec-
essarily been declared by the trial court obviously subjects the defendant 
to the same personal strain and insecurity regardless of the motivation 
underlying the trial judge's action.25 
V. THE EFFECT 
The discretion of a trial judge in declaring mistrials was greatly 
limited by the Jorn decision. However, there were still some questions 
as to his discretion when acting for the benefit of the defendant, or when 
the defendant had consented to the mistrial ruling. 26 These questions 
23. 395 u.s. 784, 794 (1969). 
24. United States v. Walden, 448 F.2d 925, 928 (4th Cir. 1971). 
25. 400 u.s. 470, 483 (1971). 
26. See generally Note, Double Jeopardy--Declaration of Mistrial Witholll Consent of Defen-
dant. 32 LA. L. REV. 145 (1971). 
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were answered, and insight given to the future application of Jorn, in 
United States v. Walden, 21 decided on September 21, 1971, by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 
Walden involved eleven defendants charged with substantive offen-
ses and conspiracy to burglarize numerous banks in various Southeast-
ern states. During the first trial, two jurors inadvertently remained in 
the jury room while the court was in a lunch recess. When the federal 
marshal discoverf':d their absence, he went back to find them and discov-
ered they had entered a hallway in the presence of several of the defen-
dants. At the time, the defendants were in custody and, the trial judge 
assumed, were handcuffed. 
When the trial judge was informed of this incident, he suggested 
that the defendants move for a mistrial. Counsel for the defendants 
requested that the prejudicial event be clarified and asked the trial judge 
to consider other curative measures.28 The judge refused to do so. After 
a short recess, four of the defendants moved for a mistrial. The court, 
however, declared a mistrial as to all the defendants and denied a mo-
tion for severance made by six of the defendants who did not join in the 
motion for mistrial.29 
On the second trial, the defendants were found guilty by jury ver-
dicts and appealed, contending, among other things, that the second 
trial constituted double jeopardy in violation of the fifth amendment. 
The court of appeals agreed with the double jeopardy argument and 
reversed under the authority of Jorn. 
The court of appeals held that, "[t]he manifest necessity doctrine 
as restated in Jorn demands a thorough inquisition by the trial judge 
into all the facts and painstaking consideration of all possible cures 
short of trial abortion."30 In Walden the trial judge not only failed to 
perform this duty, but refused to do so. The court pointed out that the 
two viewing jurors could have been questioned as to their impressions 
of the incident since they could have correctly understood the event. The 
court also felt that the two jurors could have been replaced with two 
27. 448 F.2d 925 (4th Cir. 1971). 
28. Counsel for the defendants specifically requested that the two viewing jurors be ques-
tioned as to their impressions of the incident or that the two jurors be removed and two alternates 
placed on the panel. One attorney went so far as to inform the trial judge that if a mistrial was 
declared without the consent of all the defendants there would be problems with double jeopardy 
upon retrial. 
29. The trial judge felt the incident was prejudicial because it would suggest to the two 
viewing jurors that the defendants were being held in custody for prior crimes. See Holmes v. 
United States, 284 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1960) where conviction was reversed because a court official 
inadvertently told the jury of the defendant's past criminal record. 
30. 448 F.2d 925, 930 (4th Cir. 1971). 
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alternates, or the trial could have proceeded with less than twelve jurors. 
The court of appeals then considered the four defendants who for-
mally moved for mistrial. The court noted that such a motion normally 
prevents double jeopardy claims against reprosecution, but also pointed 
out that the motion was by the trial judge rather than the defendants. 
This fact, coupled with the time element and the trial court's stated 
belief that fatal error had been committed, negated any "voluntariness" 
in the motion: 
Instead we adopt the middle ground of inquiring into the circumstances 
surrounding the formal entry of the motion. Certainly if a judge uses 
his authority to intimidate the accused into consenting (something which 
did not occur here) there is no real waiver .... But short of such 
judicial overreaching, it seems to us that when a motion for mistrial is 
invited by the court with intimation that the perceived error is fatal 
according to a decision called to counsels' attention by the court, and 
little time has been granted to consider whether such a motion should 
be made, the result of freedom for some and imprisonment for others 
should not depend simply upon which of multiple defendants made the 
motion.31 
One final point should be made about Walden. The trial judge was 
undoubtedly acting in the best interest of the defendants, not the wit-
nesses, as in Jorn. However, the court of appeals held that the judge's 
motivation was no longer a valid consideration into the problem of 
reprosecution. "We think thatJorn all but eliminates trial judge motiva-
tion as an element to be considered in determining whether an aborted 
trial bars reprosecution."32 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In closing, it can be seen that the "manifest necessity rule" an-
nounced in Perez is still valid today; however, the Jorn and Walden 
decisions have narrowed considerably the trial judge's discretion in 
applying the rule to a given factual situation. No longer can there be 
reprosecution simply because the defendant formally moves, or consents 
to, a mistrial; nor can retrial be had because the judge was acting in the 
best interest of the defendant. The trial judge must now make a thor-
ough inquisition into all the surrounding facts and circumstances and 
6xhaust all other curative measures before he declares a mistrial. 
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in Gori in 1961 
stated, "[t]he policy of the Bill of Rights is to make rare indeed the 
31. !d. at 930. 
32. !d. at 928. 
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occasions when the citizen can for the same offense be required to run 
the gantlet twice."33 This view has now been accepted by the Court. 
Due to the Jorn, Walden and Benton cases those occasions are "rare 
indeed." 
RONALD COLE BROWN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PAROLEE'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT A PA-
ROLE REVOCATION HEARING 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in Bey 
v. Connecticut State Board of Parole1 that a parolee has the right to 
have counsel at a parole revocation hearing. This note examines the 
problem of whether or not a parolee is entitled to counsel at such 
proceedings. 
II. THE CASE 
Bey had been released from prison on a finding by the parole board 
that there was a "reasonble probability that [he would] live and remain 
at liberty without violating the law and ... [that his] release [was] not 
incompatible with the welfare of society."2 Less than six months later 
he was arrested and reincarcerated because of his activities during the 
time he was on parole. The only account of Bey's conduct while he was 
on parole came to the parole board at the time of the revocation hearing 
in a report by his parole officer. The report cited certain sexual activities 
of Bey and his possession of a weapon (a knife was found in his closet) 
as parole violations. Although Bey had performed the duties required 
of him on three different jobs during his parole, he had disappointed, 
annoyed and disturbed his employers and eventually his parole officer.3 
It was a totality of events and not any one event that led his parole 
officer to consider him "mentally incapable of accepting the responsibil-
ities of parole."4 
Bey was given reasonable notice of the charges against him and was 
33. 367 u.s. 364, 373 (1961). 
I. 443 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971). 
2. ld. at 1080-81. 
3. /d. at 1081. 
4. /d. at 1082. 
